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Runtime integrity measurements identify unexpected changes in 
operating systems and hypervisors during operation, enabling 
early detection of persistent threats. System Management Mode, a 
privileged x86 CPU mode, has the potential to effectively perform 
such rootkit detection. Previously proposed SMM-based 
approaches demonstrated effective detection capabilities, but at a 
cost of performance degradation and software side effects. In this 
paper we introduce our solution to these problems, an SMM-based 
Extensible, Performance Aware Runtime Integrity Measurement 
Mechanism called EPA-RIMM. The EPA-RIMM architecture 
features a performance-sensitive design that decomposes large 
integrity measurements and schedules them to control 
perturbation and side effects. EPA-RIMM's decomposition of 
long-running measurements into shorter tasks, extensibility, and 
use of SMM complicates the efforts of malicious code to detect or 
avoid the integrity measurements. Using a Minnowboard-based 
prototype, we demonstrate its detection capabilities and 
performance impacts. Early results are promising, and suggest that 
EPA-RIMM will meet production-level performance constraints 
while continuously monitoring key OS and hypervisor data 
structures for signs of attack.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Today’s complex server platforms include software 
environments vulnerable to sophisticated malware called rootkits.  
Rootkits target sensitive low-level kernel or hypervisor data 
structures - such as interrupt handlers, event handlers, registers, 
and memory - remaining undetected for extended periods to 
achieve persistence. One response to this vulnerability has been 
the development of runtime integrity measurement mechanisms 
(RIMMs) that aim to detect rootkits before financial, political, or 
other damage occurs.  The runtime integrity measurement 
approach periodically preempts execution and examines the 
interrupted state, checking for unexpected changes in low-level 
resources. Several approaches leveraging a privileged CPU mode 
called System Management Mode (SMM) to perform the needed 
monitoring of resources in the runtime environment demonstrated 
promising rootkit detection capabilities [3][4][5].   
SMM is a general purpose, widely available mechanism on 
x86 CPUs.  Firmware on computer systems performs a variety of 
critical management tasks at runtime using SMM. This can 
include managing CPU power states, controlling low-level 
hardware, handling thermal throttling, performing BIOS flash 
updates [34], and handling memory errors, among other 
usages[1]. SMM operates at a more privileged layer than host-side 
kernel or hypervisor code.   The entry into SMM is accomplished 
by a System Management Interrupt (SMI) which typically takes 
all CPU threads1 out of the operating system or applications and 
into the SMI handler. However, the SMI’s work is generally 
processed by a single CPU thread. SMIs can be triggered by Ring 
0 software by writing values to the APM_CNT IO port on Intel 
platforms [46] and the “SMI Command Port” on AMD platforms 
[47]. Intel’s Itanium processors also feature a Platform 
Management Interrupt (PMI) that is similar to an SMI [49]. A 
proposal has been made to bring SMM-like functionality to ARM 
platforms utilizing TrustZone [48].  Upon entering SMM, the 
SMRAM Save State Map is populated with CPU register values 
from the time of interruption. An SMM RIMM can inspect this 
data to determine if unexpected changes have occurred.  SMM 
code issues an RSM instruction to exit SMM and resume host-side 
execution at the point of interruption. The Intel BITS tool 
measures the duration of SMIs on a system and warns if they are 
larger than “acceptable” limits (e.g. 150 microseconds) [7]. 
For RIMM purposes, SMM provides critical benefits:  
• SMM runs at a higher privilege than host software; 
• SMM has broad visibility into operating system and 
hypervisor (host software) memory2 and CPU registers  
• SMM is strongly isolated from host software as the 
hardware-protected SMRAM can only be read or 
written from SMM, providing a location to place 
measurement software 
• When an SMI occurs, the transitions into SMM cannot 
be prevented by malicious code; 
• When all CPU threads enter SMM, host software 
execution is paused which presents the opportunity to 
inspect the system while it is temporarily halted; and  
• As x86 systems broadly support SMM, the mechanisms 
can be readily adopted.  
                                                                  
1 As some Intel CPUs feature the HyperThreading feature which 
creates a set of logical CPUs, we refer to the logical CPUs as 
“CPU threads.” 
2 Recent open-source UEFI code updates have constrained SMM’s 
memory visibility. We discuss the implications and potential 
options in Section 5.  
† This author was a full-time employee of Intel Corp. when this work was done. 





For these reasons, SMM RIMMs present intriguing possibilities 
for adding new detection capabilities to combat host software 
rootkits. 
Our research demonstrated that an important drawback limits 
the potential of SMM-RIMMs: interference with system software 
that may lead to significant perturbation of the system and even 
software failures [2]. System software assumptions regarding 
scheduling regularity as well as task durations are challenged by 
prolonged periods of time in SMM. Early SMM RIMMs exceeded 
the published SMM guidelines by orders of magnitude. There are 
other limitations to early SMM-based approaches: the lack of 
extensibility - the inability to dynamically change the set of 
monitored resources to maintain effectiveness as new rootkits 
emerge; and the inability to adjust the frequency of checking as 
new threat information becomes available.   
In this paper, we present our solution to this problem, an 
SMM-RIMM framework called EPA-RIMM. EPA-RIMM’s goal 
is to provide quick detection of kernel or hypervisor rootkits by 
identifying unexpected changes in system state snapshots. It 
accomplishes this by periodically interrupting the running system 
to inspect sets of presumed static resources to identify changes, 
any of which would be a strong indicator of compromise.  
The key contributions of this work are:  
1. A mechanism for decomposing large integrity 
measurements to remain consistent with expectations 
regarding SMI latency. This approach removes the 
significant performance degradation incurred by 
prolonged SMIs and creates an opportunity for the 
development of new integrity measurements that were 
formerly impractical.  
2. A mechanism for throttling the rate of integrity checking.  
EPA-RIMM’s scheduler facilitates a varying time budget 
for measurements, allowing the performance-security 
tradeoff to be adjusted during runtime based on the threat 
landscape. This allows EPA-RIMM to reduce its 
performance impact on the system when necessary but 
also supports increasing it as threats emerge.  
3. An API to specify measurements during operation. This 
allows the measurements to vary depending on the 
environment and abstracts the complexity of OS/VMM-
specific details from the lowest level SMM-code.  
4. An open-source prototype of EPA-RIMM to demonstrate 
its effectiveness and performance. We plan to release 
EPA-RIMM as open-source software to facilitate its use 
as a research and educational tool.  
EPA-RIMM supports either native Linux or virtualized systems.  
In this paper, we introduce EPA-RIMM and focus on its use for 
native Linux. 
2 EPA-RIMM Architecture 
This section details the EPA-RIMM Architecture as shown in 
Figure 1. EPA-RIMM comprises the Diagnosis Manager (Section 
2.1), the Backend Manager (Section 2.2), the Host 
Communications Manager (Section 2.3) and the Inspector 
(Section 2.4). We discuss the architecture in Section 2.5.  A 
detailed example is provided in Appendix A. 
There are three key abstractions:  Checks, Tasks, and Bins.  A 
Check is a description of an integrity measurement, including a 
command and its arguments, a priority, and a decomposition 
target (to guide decomposition). Checks allow the Administrator 
to specify particular measurements over sets of memory regions, 
Control Registers, and Model-Specific Registers (MSRs). Sample 
Checks include: “Static Linux Kernel Code Sections” that 
measures the Linux kernel code sections to identify code 
injections, the “IDTR” Check that verifies that the IDTR register 
value has not unexpectedly changed, the “GDT” Check that 
measures the Global Descriptor Table (GDT) to determine if it has 
changed. Other Checks measure specific MSRs or CPU control 
registers (e.g. CR0, CR4), for example, to determine if the 
Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP) were disabled by 
malware. At runtime, Checks are decomposed into some number 
of Tasks, or partial resource measurements to meet expectations 
for SMI latency.  Tasks are scheduled by filling Bins which 
consist of the set of work to be performed in one SMI session. 
Each Bin’s size is defined as the sum of the execution times of the 
Tasks it contains.  
2.1 Diagnosis Manager 
     The Diagnosis Manager (DM) is the component that 
orchestrates the runtime integrity measurements. It decides which 
inspections to run under at a given point of time and interprets the 
measurement results. A single DM may be responsible for one or 
more nodes in a cluster, and may communicate with other 
Diagnosis Managers. The DM sends and receives information 
about attack discoveries from across the EPA-RIMM framework 
to help guide detection on other monitored nodes. This allows 
dynamically adjusting the priority of measurements to search for 
detected issues on other nodes. The DM can also interface with an 
external Security Information and Event Management system 
(SIEM) to send and receive telemetry on attacks, although a full 
description of this interface is outside of the scope of this paper. 
 
Figure 1 EPA-RIMM Architecture 
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Provisioning.  An EPA-RIMM Administrator initializes the 
Diagnosis Manager with a set of specific Checks. Each Check 
Description (left column of Table 1) describes the measurement 
operation in sufficient detail for the Backend Manger to 
decompose the Check into Tasks and for the Inspector to process 
the measurement work, including the command and parameters.  
Table 2 describes the currently supported EPA-RIMM commands 
along with their accompanying parameters.  Checks that measure 
large memory regions could exceed desired SMI session times 
and need decomposition. To determine a suitable granularity, a 
simple micro-benchmark is run during the provisioning phase to 
measure the cost per byte of various hash sizes. These parameters 
combined with the Check’s Decomposition Target in 
microseconds determines the appropriate granularity. Checks 
involving Control Registers or MSRs cannot be decomposed and 
thus consist of a single Task. Table 4 shows the parameters that 
govern the Check decomposition.  
Runtime.  The DM sends Checks to the Backend Manager.  
Each Check returns true or false, indicating whether the 
measurement matches the comparison value.  “False” results 
cause the DM to raise an alert.  The Diagnosis Manager has the 
option of increasing or decreasing the threat level, by notifying 
both the Backend Manager and any connected Diagnosis 
Managers. 
 
Table 1 Check and Task Descriptions 
Check Task Description 
ID # Unique ID 
Command Measurement to 
perform 
Operand Command arg 
Memory Address Starting address 
Length Memory 
Measurement Size 
Last inspection time   
Priority  
















Table 2 Measurement Commands and Selected Parameters 
Command Selected Parameters 
Register  CR0,CR3*,CR4,IDTR,GDTR 
(Virt|phys) Mem Address, Length 
MSR MSR Number 
 
2.2  Backend Manager 
The Backend Manager (BEM) manages the performance 
aspects of EPA-RIMM and provides measurement requests to the 
monitored systems. It receives Checks from the Diagnosis 
Manager and decomposes them into smaller Tasks to avoid 
prolonged SMM session times. The Backend Manager schedules 
tasks by filling Bins based on a target Bin size. It signs, creates a 
MAC, and encrypts each Bin and then provides it to the Host 
Communications Manager which interfaces with the SMM-based 
Inspector. The BEM waits to receive the Inspector’s results back. 
It decrypts the results and checks the signature and MAC to 
ensure that they came from the proper Inspector and were not 
tampered with in-transit. The BEM merges individual Task results 
into a single Check result of true or false and sends the results to 
the Diagnosis Manager. 
Provisioning. The Backend Manager is provisioned with the 
appropriate keys for signing and encryption. The Backend 
Manager’s Task performance estimations are set based on an 
initial performance measurement so that the EPA-RIMM can 
begin runtime operation with an appropriately sized amount of 
work in a Bin. Since there is no preemption, platform-specific 
performance prediction is accurate for SMM code. Initial 
measurements that will be re-checked over time can be gathered 
in the provisioning phase in an offline environment (preferred) or 
upon the first measurement of a resource. The latter measurement 
option is less desirable due to the possibility that malware could 
have an opportunity to register initial values.    
Runtime.  As the system experiences an overhead transitioning 
to SMM and back, minimizing the number of SMIs becomes a 
consideration. Since each SMI transfers a Bin, efficiently filling 
the Bin reduces the number of SMIs and consequently the amount 
of time spent transitioning to and from SMM.  We therefore use a 
backpack algorithm: 
Given a set of n Tasks, select a subset to fill a bounded-size 
Bin with max cost C, where each Task i has an assigned cost, 
ci, and an assigned value, vi.  
A set of Tasks can only be scheduled into the same Bin if the sum 
of their costs is less than or equal to the max cost C. The values 
represent priorities, and the costs represent the estimated runtime 
on a given system. Thus, tasks are not scheduled in strict priority 
order; a lower priority Task might be selected to "fill" a Bin in 
place of larger higher priority tasks. Priorities are adaptive; tasks 
are assigned an initial priority based on their parent Check, but 
priorities change at runtime for example with aging.  The BEM 
may increase or decrease the Bin size within set bounds.  For 
example, it may set the Bin size to the maximum Bin size Cmax 
during times of elevated threat. Cmax provides an upper bound to 
the amount of time spent in SMM in a single session to maintain 
adequate system performance. The BEM may also increase or 
decrease the SMI frequency upon direction from the DM.  
2.3  Host Communication Manager (HCM) 
     The Host Communication Manager resides within the 
monitored system and provides an interface between the Inspector 
and the BEM. The HCM should be implemented via an out-of-
band mechanism such as the BMC (Baseboard Management 





Controller) [3]. In-band mechanisms (e.g. Ring 3 application and 
kernel module) should not be used as they are vulnerable to 
malware. For example, if a Host Communication Manager process 
were to be killed by malware, the measurement would stop. While 
the Backend Manager could detect a lack of response and trigger 
an alert, there is a subtler attack that is possible. Malicious code 
could recognize that a measurement request is imminent, clean its 
traces, and then let the measurement proceed.  The HCM receives 
bins from the BEM and provides these bins to the Inspector when 
it triggers its operation via an SMI. The HCM also receives results 
from the Inspector which it returns to the BEM.  
2.4 The Inspector 
The Inspector performs the actual runtime integrity 
measurements from SMM, noting differences in the current 
measurement compared to the comparison measurement. The 
Inspector is compiled into the BIOS and is initiated via an SMI. It 
has the ability to view the interrupted host-side CPU register state 
by checking the SMRAM Save State Map, examining MSR 
values, and measuring specified regions of the host-side memory 
space. The Inspector also monitors the amount of time required by 
the measurement and returns the cost to the Backend Manager so 
that it can adaptively tune the Bin size.  
Provisioning. The Inspector must be provisioned with 
encryption and signing keys.  
Runtime.  At runtime, the Inspector will be invoked by an SMI 
coming from the Host Communications Manager that specifies the 
Bin that the Inspector should operate upon.  
The virtual addresses of the Linux kernel in the System.map or 
/proc/kallsyms that list code or data locations cannot be directly 
used by the Inspector as it operates based on physical addresses. 
The SMM Inspector walks the page tables using the CR3 to 
convert virtual addresses to physical. This mechanism provides 
the ability to bridge between the virtual and physical addressing 
schemes [4]. The Inspector returns the results as shown in Table 
3. 
The kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR) 
feature would require special handling with EPA-RIMM 
measurements as the kernel addresses would be randomized. One 
option for supporting KASLR would be to generate new 
provisioned values upon initial boot. However, at present, the 
future of KASLR is unclear [52]. There have been several recent 
attacks on the KASLR feature using page faults, prefetch, Intel 
TSX, and Branch Target Buffers and several mitigations proposed 
[39][40][41][42].  
2.5 Discussion 
The design of EPA-RIMM has several features that reduce the 
SMM storage requirements. As it is infeasible to update the BIOS 
at runtime, the inspector supports a basic set of measurement 
commands as opposed to building in operating system or 
hypervisor-specific details that could change with host software 
updates. Storing the measurement hashes in the Backend Manager 
avoids scalability issues due to limited SMM storage space.   
EPA-RIMM’s Check decomposition feature has benefits 
beyond reducing system impacts; It allows measurements to 
become more frequent and less predictable. Frequent 
measurements reduce the time interval that malware has to 
operate without potentially being inspected. Additionally, 
decomposition allows measuring a wider variety of resources than 
would be feasible before.   
EPA-RIMM gathers partial results over time instead of 
complete measurement results gathered atomically. However, 
scheduling security checks in a single atomic measurement 
session has one clear benefit; At a precise point in time, the 
measurement shows whether an entire resource is unchanged. The 
challenge with this approach is that security checks could take 
unbounded amounts of time and the number of potential checks 
grows over time. This results in clear scalability problems. 
Therefore, EPA-RIMM inspects more granular portions of 
resources over time, effectively presenting a rolling confidence 
metric.  
Supporting an extensible Check specification interface helps 
prevent measurements from becoming outdated in the presence of 
evolving rootkit techniques. SMM RIMMs that build in extensive 
host-side context into an SMM-based measurement agent are not 
suited to dealing with quickly emerging threats and host-side 
software changes. 
Table 3 Results Description 
Results Entry Source 
Check ID # BEM 
Task ID # BEM  
Result Inspector 
Measured Hash Inspector  
Measurement Cost Inspector 

























However, there are challenges in adding new resources to 
monitor at runtime. If the set of measured items is not provisioned 
at host software initialization, it is possible that malware has 
already changed the value of one of the resources. Strategies to 
address this complication could consist of measuring resources on 
an offline system or comparing results from a set of identically 
configured monitored nodes. Malware that installed itself and 
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later tried to remove itself could be detected via EPA-RIMM re-
measurements.  
All SMM RIMMs must address the scenario that once a 
resource has been checked, the measurement could go stale if an 
attacker later modifies the resource. As an example, assuming 
resource X is decomposed into four tasks (X.[1-4]). If tasks X.1, 
X.2, X.3 are performed and then the attacker compromises 
resource X region X.2, the X.4 measurement will complete and 
resource X will be declared unchanged.  The compromise will 
only be discovered at the next measurement of X.2. 
Scrubbing attacks also are challenges for SMM-based runtime 
integrity mechanisms [3]. In these attacks, malware anticipates 
when an integrity measurement will be occurring and hides its 
traces before the measurement. After the measurement completes, 
malware can restore itself. While not a complete remedy, EPA-
RIMM’s time-sliced measurement scheduling adds a complication 
to the work of an attacker relying upon transient attacks as it is not 
clear when inspections will be made and which resource will be 
examined at a given point in time.  
It is also difficult for SMM RIMMs to be completely stealthy. 
A motivated attacker could leverage timing information to 
ascertain losses of control. The developers of a stealthy SMM-
based debugger, MALT, note that while they were able to adjust 
various system timers in SMM to hide their operation, a dedicated 
attacker could send an encrypted message to a remote timing 
server to get accurate sense of time [28]. For these reasons, while 
SMM RIMMs operate independently from host software, 
complete stealth appears infeasible.   
3 EPA-RIMM Minnowboard Prototype 
We developed a prototype based on the Minnowboard Turbot 
system [17]. The prototype implements a subset of the EPA-
RIMM architecture. Our prototype system does not have an out-
of-band communication mechanism, therefore we demonstrate the 
functionality using an in-band mechanism. This is sufficient for 
the research prototype since it does not share the security 
requirements of a production system. We implemented four 
separate modules: The Backend Manager (BEM), an in-band Host 
Communications Manager (consisting of the “Frontend Manager” 
(FEM) and “Ring 0 Manager” (R0M) modules), and the Inspector. 
The BEM runs on a network server while the other components 
reside on the monitored system.  Our current prototype does not 
implement the Diagnosis Manager.   
Hardware.  We selected the Minnowboard as it is unique in 
offering allowing the ability to recompile and re-flash its firmware 
and supports the x86 CPU architecture. This board, however, has 
less computational resources than a typical server platform that 
EPA-RIMM would be running on. The Turbot features a dual core 
Intel Atom e3826 processor with a base clock of 1.46 GHz, 2 GB 
RAM, onboard gigabit Ethernet, and supports a SATA disk [26]. 
We installed Ubuntu 12.04 64bit with a 3.7.16 kernel on the 
attached SSD.  
Firmware.  We modified the SMI handler in the UEFI source 
(Minnowboard Max firmware version 0.94) by creating an EPA-
RIMM DXE_SMM_DRIVER which registers a new software 
SMI using the EFI_SMM_SW_DISPATCH_PROTOCOL. We 
integrated OpenSSL 1.0.2d support into the Inspector for SHA256 
hashing for measurements, AES256-CBC for encryption, and 
HMAC SHA256.   
Backend Manager (BEM).  We implemented our Backend 
Manager in Python. It sets up a network socket connection with a 
set of Frontend Managers (one per monitored system). We add a 
set of tasks directly to the BEM's priority queues that it maintains 
for each Monitored Node. As each monitored system may process 
tasks at different rates, the number of tasks that fit in a given Bin 
size may vary across systems.  
Frontend Manager (FEM).  The FEM receives the signed, and 
encrypted Bin from the BEM and writes it to a /proc interface that 
is registered by the Ring 0 Manager. After each Bin has been 
processed, the Frontend Manager retrieves the results from the 
/proc interface and send them to the BEM.  
Ring 0 Manager.  The Ring 0 Manager (Linux kernel module) 
receives the Bin from the Frontend Manager via the write to the 
/proc interface. The Ring 0 Manager then records the virtual 
memory location of the Bin in a CPU register. After this, it 
triggers the measurement SMI by writing a pre-arranged value to 
port 0xB2.  
Inspector. For the provisioning phase, the Inspector computes 
hash values for the specified operation (MSR, CPU register, or 
memory region) and writes the hash value back into the results 
data structure. For subsequent measurements, the Inspector 
receives an initial hash value from the BEM for comparison.   
3.1 Attack Detection Using the Prototype 
To demonstrate EPA-RIMM’s ability to detect rootkits, we 
implemented and ran four known compromise techniques with a 
Linux-based platform:  1. changes to the Interrupt Descriptor 
Table Register (IDTR); 2. changes to CR4.SMEP; and 3. a change 
in a Linux kernel code section, as would be done in a kernel code 
injection rootkit. 4. Hooking of the system call table via a write to 
CR0 and modification of kernel read only data structures.  
3.1.1 Interrupt Descriptor Table Register (IDTR).  The IDT 
hooking rootkit attack targets the Interrupt Descriptor Table 
Register (IDTR) which holds the virtual address of the Interrupt 
Descriptor Table (IDT) [20]. The IDT associates interrupts or 
exceptions with their handler routines as IDT Entries. There are 
two variants of this attack: insertion of malicious code into one or 
more IDT entries; or overwriting of the IDTR value to point to a 
new, modified copy of the entire IDT. We demonstrate the EPA-
RIMM prototype’s detection of a change in the IDTR.  
 
EPA-RIMM Check: {Command = Register (IDTR) } 
 
Normal Functioning 
1. Provisioning: The IDTR Check is enabled and the BEM adds 
it as a single Task in the priority queue.  





2. Scheduling: The BEM schedules the IDTR Task by placing it 
in a Bin and sending it to the FEM.  
3. Frontend Processing: The FEM receives the Bin and writes it 
to the Ring 0 Manager /proc interface. The Ring 0 Manager 
generates a measurement SMI providing the physical address 
of the Bin.  
4. Inspector: The Inspector receives the SMI; it uses a known 
CPU register value to determine the Bin address, and handles 
each Task in the Bin sequentially. In this case, the Inspector 
decrypts the Bin, checks its signature, and reads the upper 
and lower IDTR fields from the SMRAM Save State map for 
each CPU thread, records a hash for the measurement in the 
results data structure, signs and encrypts the results.  
Compromise: Once the Inspector has provisioned the initial 
values, we performed an attack on the IDTR by changing its value 
from kernel code, mimicking the operations of a rootkit. This 
attack uses a published example of saving the original IDT, 
copying it to a newly allocated kernel page, saving the memory 
address of the newly allocated kernel page, and loading the 
address of the new page into the IDTR register [18].   
Detection: At the next IDTR measurement, the Inspector re-
checked the IDTR value from the SMRAM Save State Map and 
flagged the difference in the results that it returns.   
3.1.2. CR4.SMEP Disable.  One important CPU-based security 
feature is Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP). This 
prevents ring 0 code from being able to execute instructions from 
user-mode pages. The SMEP feature is enabled by setting bit 20 
in the CR4 control register.  
 
EPA-RIMM Check: {Command = Register (CR4) } 
 
Normal Functioning 
1. Provisioning: We prepare for an initial measurement of the 
CR4 value by enabling the CR4 register Check.   
2. The flow proceeds similarly to the previously described steps 
2-4 in Section 3.1.1 with the difference that the Inspector 
looks up the CR4 register values for both CPU threads in the 
respective SMRAM Save State Maps. 
Compromise. We disabled CR4.SMEP using a kernel module 
utility.  
Detection.  At the next measurement of the CR4 value, the 
Inspector detected the change on both CPU threads due to a hash 
difference.		 
 3.1.3.  Kernel Rootkit Code Injection.  
 The Snakso rootkit appeared in 2012 and targeted 64-bit Linux 
kernels [19]. After becoming entrenched in the Linux kernel, it 
replaced the kernel’s tcp_sendmsg function with a 
compromised version that injected malicious web browser 
iFrames into HTTP traffic. This type of rootkit could be 
detectable by hashing portions of the Linux kernel as the rootkit 
modified or replaced the vfs_readdir, vfs_read, 
filldir64, and filldir kernel functions. For simplicity, we 
modified kernel function 
ftrace_raw_event_xen_mc_entry, that was not utilized 
during our system’s execution. 
 
EPA-RIMM Check: {Command = Virt Memory  (Kernel Code 
Start to Kernel Code End), Length = 4KB } 
 
Normal Functioning 
1. Provisioning: EPA-RIMM is initialized with 4K hash values 
for the kernel code memory region upon the first 
measurement.  
2.  The flow proceeds similar to the previously described steps 
2-4 in Section 3.1.1.  
3. The Inspector receives the Bin and performs a SHA 256 hash 
for the specified address and length. The Inspector returns 
the hash result to the BEM.  
Compromise. To simulate a memory compromise, we overwrote 
an area of kernel code using a debug capability.   
Detection. Upon the subsequent re-measurement, the Inspector 
identified a difference in the current and provisioned hashes for 
the task covering the function’s code and returns a changed result.   
3.1.3 System Call Hooking.  
One common attack strategy for rootkits is to hook critical 
kernel data structures such as the system call table. This attack 
endeavors to trigger attacker-provided code to execute when a 
trigger is invoked. An example of this attack is a demonstration 
attack published by forb1dd3n called sys_call_hijack [50]. This 
attack searches for the location of the system call table in the 
System.map file, clears the write-protect bit in CR0, modifies the 
system call table to insert a new attacker-provided function, and 
re-enables the write-protect bit in CR0. EPA-RIMM has two 
potential Checks that can detect this attack, kernel read-only data 
structure Check and a CR0 Check. As the attack would be 
intended to persist, the kernel read-only data structure Check 
would be able to detect the change upon its next execution as the 
attack would necessitate a change in the system call table. It is 
also theoretically possible that EPA-RIMM could detect a change 
in progress for the CR0 register, however, EPA-RIMM would 
need to be invoked at precisely the time where the CR0 register 
had changed (to disable write-protect) and later returned to its 
initial value.  
EPA-RIMM Check 1: {Command = Virt Memory {Kernel Read 
Only Data Structure Start to Kernel Read Only Data Structure 
End} 
EPA-RIMM Check 2: {Command = Register (CR0) } 
 
Normal Functioning 
1. Provisioning: EPA-RIMM is initialized with hash values for the 
kernel read only data sections and also the CR0 value hashed. The 
flow proceeds similarly to steps 2-4 in Section 3.1.1.  
A Framework for Dynamic SMM-based Runtime …   
 
 7 
Compromise: We load the sys_call_hijack rootkit and monitor 
EPA-RIMMs alerts.  
Detection: The Inspector identifies a change in the kernel read-
only data structures. Detecting a change in the CR0 register would 
require EPA-RIMM execution at the time that it had changed.  
3.2 Discussion 
In this section, we demonstrated the ability of EPA-RIMM to 
detect rootkit techniques that compromised the IDTR, CR4 
register, kernel code, and read-only kernel data structures. The 
prototype’s extensible design allows dynamically changing the set 
of measurements performed by EPA-RIMM by creating and 
scheduling new tasks to be performed by the Inspector. The 
prototype’s ability to process multiple tasks of shorter durations 
demonstrates that larger measurement tasks such as those 
covering the kernel memory region can be accomplished in 
smaller portions reducing the impact on the running system.  
4. Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of EPA-RIMM 
and provide a simple performance model for EPA-RIMM 
overheads.  
4.1 A simple performance model 
The total time for an SMI-based measurement can be 
represented as Tm, where 
Tm = Tentry + Twork + Texit 
 
and Tentry is the time to enter SMM, Twork is the total time to 
accomplish the measurement, and Texit is the time to transition out 
of SMM.  
Twork is platform dependent and varies with the specific type of 
measurement.  Twork  can be broken down as follows: 
Twork  = Tverify + Ttask + Teval + Tpackage + Tcopy 
Tverify = Tdecrypt + Tsigcheck 
Tpackage = + Tsign +  Tintegrity + Tencrypt 
(see Table 5) 
 
Table 5 EPA-RIMM Latency Analysis 
SMI Latency Component Cost dependent on: 
Tentry : Transition time to enter SMM Platform, CPU C-state, 
firmware  
Tdecrypt	:		Bin	Decryption	 Number of tasks, decryption algorithm performance Tsigcheck	:	Bin	signature	check	 Signature verification algorithm Ttask	:	Task	Processing	 Number and type of tasks in Bin Teval	:	Measurement	evaluation	 Number of tasks in Bin Tsign:	Creation	of	results	signature	 Signature creation algorithm Tencrypt	:	Results	encryption	 Number of results, encryption algorithm performance Tintegrity:	 Integrity	 measurement	(e.g.	HMAC)	of	bin	or	results		 MAC performance and size of bin or results 
Tcopy	:	Copy	of	results	to	HCM	 Number of results Texit	:	Return	from	SMM	 Platform, firmware version 
4.2 Latency Guidelines 
To get a starting baseline for SMI latency on the 
Minnowboard Turbot, we measured the cost for a basic software 
SMI by taking CPU timestamps before and after a sequence of 
1000 basic SMIs that wrote a value of 0 to port 0xB2. For this 
testing, we set the CPU to run at the C0 C-state to avoid the 
variable performance impact of C-state transitions. CPU C-states 
allow power savings when the CPU is idle and transitioning 
between states can take varying amounts of time depending on the 
C-state transition [51]. The generated SMI has minimal 
processing and the average amount of time to process each SMI 
was 105 microseconds. Meeting the SMI latency target of Tm = 
150 usec thus requires Twork  <= 45 usec.  
In Figure 2a we show the minimal cost for the CR4 
measurement used in Section 3, which includes access time to 
CR4 values from the SMRAM Save State Map for both CPU 
threads and comparison with the expected values. The average 
time was 0.6 microseconds. This measurement consists of items 
Ttask  + Teval  + Tsign in the performance model. 
The kernel memory hash costs (Ttask) vary by the amount of 
memory hashed (Figure 2b). We observe that the hash costs show 
low variance due to the lack of interruption in SMM. In Figure 2c, 
we show the total Bin costs Tm for kernel memory hashing. These 
Bin costs assume one Task per Bin and each bar consists of all 
EPA-RIMM SMI overheads enumerated in the performance 
model. SMI transition time consists of the time entering and 
exiting SMM, Tentry + Texit.  The non-hash Inspector costs consist 
of all Inspector overhead excluding the hash measurement 
operation: Tdecrypt + Tsigcheck + Teval + Tsign + Tencrypt  + Tcopy. (Note: 
Tintegrity is not yet included in these numbers.) These costs are 
essentially constant. In contrast, the hash costs are completely 
dependent on the chosen hash size. We have not yet applied 
performance optimizations for the Inspector so it is possible that 
the Inspector costs can be reduced further. 
Given the tight SMI processing timeframes, care needs to be 
taken in ensuring that signature checking, hashing, and encryption 





times are kept minimal. Presently, our prototype Inspector 
performs a simple signature check that is not RSA-based which 
reduces the time requirements. A costlier signature check would 
increase EPA-RIMM costs for items Tsigcheck  and Tsign. 
In Table 6, we compare EPA-RIMM’s SMI durations and 
frequency compared to the other SMM RIMMs. We observe that 
due to Check decomposition, EPA-RIMM is able to significantly 
undercut the times for previous methods, coming close to the SMI 
latency expectations on very modest CPU hardware. By limiting 
SMI durations, negative interactions with device drivers, 
application performance, and host software code can be greatly 
reduced [2].   
4.3 Performance Impact 
To evaluate the performance impact of EPA-RIMM, we 
compared three scenarios: A. No SMIs (Baseline), B. Frequent 
8KB hashes (22 hashes of 8KB size every second which was the 
fastest rate supported by our prototype), C. Infrequent large 
hashes (two hashes of 1MB size every second).  We utilized the 
Phoronix Memcached, SQLite, and cachebench benchmarks and 
compared the throughput achieved by both EPA-RIMM scenarios 
against our baseline in which no SMIs occurred [45]. The first two 
workloads are representative of server workloads that could be 
running on EPA-RIMM monitored servers and the cachebench 
workload illustrates CPU cache-related effects. For Memcached 
we utilized the ‘get’ benchmark which retrieves values from the 
memory object cache. SQLite exercises the disk subsystem. For 
cachebench, we focused on cache read performance, however, 
cache writes and read-modify-update performed very similarly.   
Our test system utilized the in-band Ring 0 Manager and 
Frontend Manager which consumed a small percentage of CPU 
time. Production EPA-RIMM implementations using the specified 
out-of-band interface would not have these costs.  
For the 22 x 8KB hash EPA-RIMM scenario, shown in Figure 
2d, we observe that CPU cache results are only slightly impacted 
as the workload still achieves 99.23% of its baseline throughput. 
Memcached shows a larger impact as the scenario achieves 
94.77% of its baseline throughput. Similarly, SQLite achieved 
96% of the baseline performance. The 2x1MB hash scenario 
performance are similar at 94.3%, 94.09%, and 95.78% 
respectively. Beyond the amount of CPU time taken away, the 
cachebench results indicate that there is an additional impact on 
the CPU caches greater than the time spent in SMM. This may be 
a combination of host-side Ring 0 Manager, EPA-Frontend 
network traffic, and Inspector activities.  As the Backend Manager 
can readily control the frequency of measurements as well as the 
measurement size, EPA-RIMM can dial up or down the system 
impact via these two factors.  
Table 6 SMI Time Comparison of SMM RIMMs 
SMM RIMM SMI Duration Frequency 
HyperCheck 40ms 1 per second 
HyperSentry 35ms* 1 per 8 or 16 sec 




0.24 ms+ Dynamic 
(Goal) 0.15 ms Not specified 
*HyperSentry utilizes several SMIs to complete the measurement, totaling 
35 ms. 





# hashes Aggregate SMM 
Time (uSecs) 
BEM Space Req. 
(Bytes) for SHA 256 
0.5   18,432	 4,442,112	 589,824	
1 9,216	 		2,359,296	 294,912		
2      4,608          1,331,712                     147,456 
4     2,304             827,136                      73,728 















Figure 2 (top to bottom) (a) Performance cost of CR4 
Measurement, (b) SHA256 Hash Times (SMM Inspector), (c) 
Total EPA-RIMM SMI durations for varied hash sizes, (d) 
Application and Microbenchmark Performance for 
cachebench read, Memcached, and SQLite. 
4.4 Check Decomposition Trade-offs 
Check decomposition allows EPA-RIMM to minimize the 
amount of time spent in a single SMM measurement session. 
However, it involves an overall efficiency trade-off as smaller 
amounts of work processed per SMI result in more SMIs in total.  
Methodology.  We gathered a list of Linux kernel code 
sections utilizing the System.map file for the 3.7.6 kernel running 
on our monitored node. The size was around 9 MB. For these 
sections, we examined decompositions of 1K, 2K, 4K, 8K hash 
sizes. We calculate the wall-clock time to drain the queue with the 
Backend Manager scheduling 22 bins per second. We utilized the 
total Bin processing time as measured by the Ring 0 Manager in 
which we gathered the CPU’s time-stamp counter before and after 
the measurement SMI trigger.  We also counted the number of 
SMIs by logging MSR_SMI_COUNT (0x34) in the Ring 0 
Manager to verify the rate of SMIs.  We note that here we assume 
a fixed rate of SMIs, but production EPA-RIMM instances would 
randomize the Bin scheduling to be less predictable. 
Results.  With a fixed rate of issuing the bins and the larger 
hash size, the 8KB queue takes the least amount of time at 52.4 
seconds to hash the kernel code sections. Each 8KB measurement, 
requires 494 microseconds in SMM.  As there would be 1,152 
hashes over 8KB memory regions, this would require 36,864 
bytes of hash storage space on the Backend Manager when using 
SHA256. On the other end of the spectrum, a queue of 0.5 KB 
hashes would be accomplished in 838 seconds, requiring 241 
microseconds in SMM, and 589,824 bytes of hash storage on the 
Backend Manager. Figure 3 and Table 7 provide results for other 
measurement hash sizes.  
The third column in Table 7 shows the aggregate amount of 
time in SMM across the necessary number of SMI sessions 
required to complete the kernel memory hash. For example, in the 
most extreme case, the 0.5 KB hash requires an aggregate of 
4,442,112 microseconds in SMM to complete the kernel hash as 
there are 18,432 SMIs required (assuming one Task per Bin), 
while the 8KB hash can perform the same work in 569,088 
microseconds and only require 1,152 SMIs. The appropriate trade-
off between SMI latency and overall measurement throughput on 
a given system, are tunable parameters:  Bin size and frequency. 
These knobs can be adjusted upwards during the spread of an 
attack or dialed down to emphasize application performance. 
 
Figure 3 Hash Time 
4.5 Encryption and Hashing Performance 
     As the Inspector SMI latencies would benefit from a 
performance increase in encryption, decryption, and hashing, we 
compared the hashing and encryption performance on our 
prototype system with a higher-end laptop CPU. For this study, 
we utilized OpenSSL 1.1.0b. We prepared a Minnowboard Turbot 
with an Atom E3826 with a base clock of 1.46 GHz and also an 
Intel NUC utilizing a laptop-class CPU (Core i5 6260U CPU) 
with a base clock of 1.86 GHz. We measured 1K block sizes for 
AES 256 CBC encryption and SHA 256 performance without 
AESNI acceleration.  The Intel Core i5 6260U performed 4.41x 
better than the Intel Atom E3826 on AES 256 CBC. For SHA256, 
the Core i5 achieved 5.26x greater throughput than the Atom for 
this workload. These results show that our prototype could reduce 
time spent in Tdecrypt , Ttask  (hashing), Tencrypt with a higher 
performance CPU.  
4.6 Performance Conclusions 
Our performance results show that EPA-RIMM comes very 
close to the SMI latency expectations. This result on modest CPU 
hardware is orders of magnitude better than other SMM RIMMs, 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the decomposition approach. 
We expect that higher performing CPUs could improve upon 
these numbers due to reduced costs for hashing, decryption, and 





encryption operations. Factors that could increase the time spent 
in SMM consist of HMAC and a more robust signature checking 
mechanism. While decomposition avoids prolonged SMM 
sessions, there is a trade-off in overall measurement efficiency. 
Finally, the memory requirements on the Backend Manager are 
reasonable as a single Backend Manager could support many 
thousands of monitored nodes and multiple Backend Managers 
can be readily deployed in the EPA-RIMM framework as 
necessary.  
5  Security Analysis of EPA-RIMM 
In this section, we describe our assumptions and analyze 
potential threats against EPA-RIMM. We consider attacks against 
SMM and EPA-RIMM components and on requests and results, 
side channels, initial measurements, infrastructure compromise 
and denial of service, crypto/signing attacks, and transient evasion 
attacks. 
Assumptions.  We assume that initial measurements can be 
gathered during a provisioning process. We also assume that 
SMRAM is well-protected and leverages available hardware 
protections including SPI protections over the BIOS chip and 
proper SMRR configuration. The CHIPSEC tool can be used to 
verify proper platform SMM configuration [23]. EPA-RIMM also 
assumes the presence of an out-of-band network interface to allow 
communication of measurements requests and results. We assume 
the out-of-band interface is not malicious.  
Threat Model.  EPA-RIMM targets scenarios where an 
attacker has gained control over the operating system or 
hypervisor at runtime. This can include code injection into these 
privileged layers.    
Inspector.  The Inspector, residing within SMM, may be 
targeted by the attacker. One potential attack is a confused deputy 
attack in which the attacker attempts to trick the Inspector into 
overwriting SMRAM memory or other privileged memory. The 
Inspector should be written such that it checks any input buffers to 
ensure that they don’t reside within the SMRR. The Inspector 
should also communicate directly to the Host Communications 
Manager and not write data into OS-controlled memory.   Attacks 
on EPA-RIMM’s Inspector could attempt to forge a measurement 
request from a malicious Backend Manager in order to gain 
additional insights into operation of the system. For this reason, it 
is important that the Inspector and Backend Manager properly 
authenticate communications with each other using a signature 
verification over the communications. The Inspector and Backend 
Manager also use encryption for their communications to prevent 
eavesdropping or tampering.  The use of a nonce prevents replay 
attacks in which previous measurements are passed off as current 
measurements.  The Inspector should not return more information 
than is required to determine an unwanted change has occurred. 
By returning hashes instead of actual measurement values, the 
Inspector helps limit its potential usefulness as a side channel. 
Initial Measurements and EPA-RIMM launch.  The treatment 
of initial measurements requires special handling. They should be 
provisioned by an Administrator in an offline environment to 
avoid compromised values appearing as pristine values. In 
homogeneous environments with a large number of systems 
running identical kernel and OS versions, it may be possible to 
gather an initial measurement on one or more nodes and store 
their results for comparison against other identically-configured 
nodes. New kernel versions would require re-provisioning due to 
differences in memory layout.  Once the host software launches 
with a trusted boot, EPA-RIMM can begin servicing measurement 
requests over the out-of-band Host Communications Manager 
interface. 
Infrastructure Compromise and Denial of Service. If a Denial 
of Service were to affect the DM or Backend Manager, the flow 
of measurement requests would slow or cease. Monitoring of the 
flow of EPA-RIMM measurements would be necessary to identify 
this type of attack. If the Diagnosis Manager were to be 
compromised, it would be possible to misdirect EPA-RIMM to 
monitor an unrelated set of resources while an attack executes or 
share false reports of attack detection in an attempt to guide 
measurements on other nodes. For this reason, the EPA-RIMM 
Administrator should monitor and investigate the threat 
intelligence exchanged by EPA-RIMM and also audit the Checks 
that are being performed for unexpected changes. A compromise 
of the Backend Manager could expose the hash database. 
However, this is of limited use as the Backend Manager only 
stores hashes as opposed to memory contents.  
Transient Evasion Techniques. All snapshot-based periodic 
inspections have the potential to miss attack detection if signs of 
the attack were not present at the measurement interval. EPA-
RIMM, unlike other SMM RIMMs, can be used to measure more 
frequently, in smaller portions to reduce the amount of time 
between periodic measurements. Additionally, varying the set of 
measured items dynamically at runtime leads to less predictable 
measurements which complicates the attacker’s task.   
Host-side Memory Visibility. A recent Minnowboard Max 
firmware release (version 0.97) has added enhanced protections 
for SMM code that would require modifications for EPA-RIMM 
to function [24]. These changes unmap host-side memory from 
the SMM code and also check to see if host-side memory accesses 
are within the Communications Buffer (CommBuffer). As EPA-
RIMM relies upon the ability to inspect host memory, 
modifications to allow host memory to be readable would be 
necessary for functionality. We have prototyped changes that 
allow proper EPA-RIMM functioning on the 0.97 codebase and 
are investigating enhancements to EPA-RIMM to find a balance 
between efforts to constrain SMM memory and EPA-RIMM’s 
measurement requirements.  
6 RELATED WORK 
Rootkit detection could in theory be rendered unnecessary by 
accurate and complete rootkit prevention mechanisms (see  
SecVisor [13] Lares [36] PerspicuOS [35] and Microsoft Virtual 
Secure Mode (VSM) [38]). In the absence of perfect instantaneous 
prevention, these are complementary to EPA-RIMM. 
Development of rootkit detection mechanisms has been 
characterized as a “race to the bottom” in which more privileged 
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layers are examined when threats appear [43]. Pure software-
based approaches such as rkscan [8][9] and St. Michael [29] can 
be easily deployed; however, effective protection of the 
measurement mechanism is infeasible because it runs in the same 
context as the malicious code it is trying to detect. Hardware-
based mechanisms can achieve a greater isolation from malicious 
code due to lower-level hardware protections over their agent. 
Due to their isolated contexts, hardware peripheral-based 
approaches such as Copilot [10], MGUARD [11], Vigilare [6], 
and DeepWatch [12] are limited in their ability to gain full access 
to the necessary CPU and memory state.  MGUARD has the 
unique capability to detect SMM rootkits due to its integration 
into the memory module itself. Vigilare is able to catch transient 
attacks, which compromise the system then hide traces of their 
presence in order to avoid detection. However, as Vigilare lacks 
access to the CPU registers, it is vulnerable to relocation attacks. 
DeepWatch can detect and remediate low-level virtualization-
based rootkits by using chipset hardware out of band of the host 
CPU. Flicker [16] and Sailer, Zhang et al. [15] leverage the 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to dynamically measure 
executable content such as applications, the kernel, and kernel 
modules on a running Linux system before invocation or use 
[33][44]. McAfee Deep Defender [14] utilizes a security 
hypervisor to monitor several key Windows resources in a 
virtualized Windows guest. These resources include the IDT, 
SSDT, DKOM list, kernel code sections, certain device drivers, 
among others [30]. This approach benefits from strong isolation 
between the monitored environment and the security hypervisor 
and can also provide quick detection of improper accesses as they 
occur, but at a significant performance cost [31]. Work by Demme 
et al. leverages CPU performance counters to detect anomalous 
rootkit behavior [32]. This approach can be integrated into EPA-
RIMM as an additional type of Check, and is complementary to 
our efforts. 
Previously proposed SMM RIMMs include HyperSentry [3], 
HyperCheck [4], and SPECTRE [5].  Our work is influenced by 
these prior efforts and also extends the state of the art, as follows:  
Context.  Our approach is influenced by SPECTRE’s methods for 
understanding host-side data structures, however we do not build 
this understanding into the Inspector, instead, allowing the Check 
contents to direct the Inspector’s operation [5]. 
SMM RIMM Measurement Trigger. The EPA-RIMM 
architecture utilizes a similar mechanism to HyperSentry to 
invoke SMM-RIMM measurements out-of-band; This approach is 
different from HyperCheck’s network card approach or 
SPECTRE’s chipset timer; the former is vulnerable to network 
card firmware-based attacks, while the latter is limited to a small 
number of scheduling options supported by chipset hardware and 
thus would be relatively predictable.   
Location of measurement code/Extensibility.  While EPA-
RIMM’s Inspector resides in SMM, it does not build in hostside 
context (as SPECTRE and HyperCheck do), instead processing 
measurement requests. When the OS/VMM is updated, the 
measurement requests could change but the Inspector code does 
not require an update as it supports fundamental building blocks 
for new measurements.  This significantly improves the ability to 
react to emerging threats and to thwart efforts of rootkits to avoid 
detection by the monitoring tool. 
Hardware Requirements. HyperSentry uses specific SMI chipset 
routing and a modified BMC. HyperCheck utilizes an SMM-
enabled network card, SPECTRE utilizes a dedicated network 
card for SMM communication. EPA-RIMM can utilize any out-
of-band mechanism such as a BMC.  
Measurement Decomposition. EPA-RIMM is unique in natively 
supporting the ability to decompose long-running measurements. 
This allows it to avoid prolonged SMI delays that would result in 
system perturbation [2]. The approach complicates an attacker’s 
understanding of what is being monitored as EPA-RIMM 
interleaves decomposed measurements which results in additional 
non-determinism.   
7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have introduced EPA-RIMM, a Runtime 
Integrity Measurement Mechanism that presents a flexible and 
scalable way to utilize System Management Mode for rootkit 
detection. EPA-RIMM represents a significant re-design of the 
SMM RIMM concept, providing several new contributions. We 
utilize Check decomposition to bound the perturbation and enable 
a wide variety of measurements to be performed over periods of 
time, ensuring scalability when new or more complex 
measurements are required; thus rendering continuous monitoring 
feasible. This also introduces a degree of nondeterminism, as 
smaller tasks are interleaved and scheduled at randomized 
intervals, thus reducing predictability.  EPA-RIMM’s Check 
description API allows crafting of new Checks to respond to 
emerging threats in the environment.  We have also presented a 
Minnowboard-based EPA-RIMM prototype that can be used for 
research and education purposes. We plan an open source release 
of the prototype code.   
The EPA-RIMM project is ongoing.   Our current focus spans 
several important thrusts.  We are continuing development of the 
Diagnosis Manager, exploring a number of new Checks and types 
of measurements, particularly focused on the hypervisor and on 
automated Check triggers.  We are developing a simulator to 
evaluate scheduling. Finally, one key performance impact of 
SMM time is that all host CPUs are unavailable for application 
processing while they are in SMM, and for security we do not 
want to allow them to run application code while we are 
performing our measurements. To address this scaling issue, we 
are developing the needed infrastructure to utilize all cores for 
SMM-mode measurements.   
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Appendix A:  A complete example of EPA-RIMM’s active monitoring phase 




Figure 4.  A complete example of EPA-RIMM’s active monitoring phase.  In this simplified example, the same Bin is provided to 
all monitored nodes, but in a heterogeneous environment the bins and the hash costs could differ between nodes. We show the Backend 
Manager and the Inspector as residing on separate machines, but there is no requirement for this separation.  (1) The DM creates three 
kernel function Checks: “A”, “B”, and “C” with costs of 150, 100, and 25 microseconds respectively, priorities of 2, 1, and 0 respectively 
(higher numbers indicate higher priority), and Decomposition targets of 75 microseconds; and sets an initial target Bin size of 100 
microseconds.  (2) The BEM performs decomposition and enqueues tasks A.0, A.1, B.0, B.1, and C.0. (3) The BEM forms the next Bin 
following the Backpack Algorithm, then signs and encrypts it.  (4) The BEM send the Bin to the HCM.  (6) The HCM triggers an SMI.  (7) 
The Inspector performs the measurements and sends the results to the Backend Manager. In this example, A.0 tests false, indicating an 
unexpected change. (8) The Backend Manager immediately passes this alert to the Diagnosis Manager. After the first Bin, Check B only 
has incomplete results and Check C has not been processed. When the bins containing the remaining tasks for Check B and C have been 
processed, the BEM merges the individual Task results into Check results which it provides to the Diagnosis Manager. In the event that the 
BEM does not receive a response from one of the bins within a predefined interval, the BEM will raise an alert to the Diagnosis Manager. 
 
